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Abstract
The drastic effect of local alliances in three-party competition is
investigated in democratic hierarchical bottom-up voting. The results
are obtained analytically using a model which extends a sociophysics
frame introduced in 1986 [1] and 1990 [2] to study two-party systems
and the spontaneous formation of democratic dictatorship. It is worth
stressing that the 1990 paper was published in the Journal of Statisti-
cal Physics, the first paper of its kind in the journal. It was shown how
a minority in power can preserve its leadership using bottom-up demo-
cratic elections. However such a bias holds only down to some critical
value of minimum support. The results were used latter to explain
the sudden collapse of European communist parties in the nineties.
The extension to three-party competition reveals the mechanisms by
which a very small minority party can get a substantial representation
at higher levels of the hierarchy when the other two competing parties
are big. Additional surprising results are obtained, which enlighten
the complexity of three-party democratic bottom-up voting. In partic-
ular, the unexpected outcomes of local voting alliances are singled out.
Unbalanced democratic situations are exhibited with strong asymme-
tries between the actual bottom support of a party and its associated
share of power at the top leadership. Subtle strategies are identified
for a party to maximize its hold on the top leadership. The results are
also valid to describe opinion dynamics with three competing opinions.
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1 Back to the future
1.1 A bit of history
In the year 1990 the Journal of Statistical Physics has published a paper,
“strange” at that time, named “Social Paradoxes of majority Rules Voting
and renormalization Group” in its Volume 61 [2]. Before the paper went
to print the Editor in Chief Joel Lebowitz wrote a handwritten letter to
the author of the paper to notice him his personal negative view about the
subject of the paper and its eventual potential for further research. However,
contrary to the practice of some Editors, he followed, against his personal
view, the recommendation to publish the paper from the Associate Editor
Dietrich Stauffer who was handling the referee process.
Such a personal rigor to keep up with the Journal procedures against a
subjective feelings must be saluted. It is hard today to appreciate the full
significance of such a choice due to the current radically different frame of
mind with respect to interdisciplinary studies and the numerous applications
of physics outside physics.
At those times, while I was advocating the use of modern Statistical
Physics to describe social and political phenomena a` la manie`re of an ac-
tivist, all physicists besides a very few individuals, leading and non leading,
old and young, were adamantly hostile to the very idea of Sociophysics. It
was perceived as heretic, a total blaspheme, a non sense, a wrong idea. In-
deed to evoke the hypothesis that humans could behave, even in part, as
atoms was look upon as an evident absurdity. Note that outside physics the
rejection was as total as inside physics, in particular among social scientists.
A short testimony is given in [3] and a full report in [4].
However, despite the overwhelming condemnation of the physicists’s com-
munity I kept on my activism convinced of the rightness of my vision. The
courageous attitude of Lebowitz to publish one of my first sociophysics paper
combined with the energetic enthusiasm of the young Dietrich Stauffer, have
helped me a good deal to keep me on the building of sociophysics. Those
earlier papers, the epistemolgical and political ones, which did envision the
bursting of sociophysics are indeed totally unknown and I take the advantage
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of this special issue to cite them [5–13].
It is worth to stress that to the best of my knowledge this publication [2]
has made the Journal of Statistical Physics the first physics international
research journal ever to print a full paper whose content is the use of physics
to describe a socio-political phenomenon. This earlier event grounds back the
current special issue in the solid tradition of the editorial policy conducted
by the Chief Editor Lebowitz. Today, sociophysics is an established stream
of research in physics [4,14–17] with numerous topics of social sciences being
investigated. In particular a good deal of papers has been devoted to the
study of opinion dynamics [18–34].
1.2 From two to three-party competition
In the next Section the use of bottom-up democratic voting in hierarchical
structures is reviewed [1,2]. Natural and reasonable biases are shown to pro-
duce a major and unexpected breaking of the democratic balance expected
from the use of majority rule, driving the stable establishment of democratic
dictatorship. This demonstration is performed in the case of two competing
parties A and B as it is often the case with all kind of competitions which
end up as a binary race. Those effects were a result of the existence of ties
at voting in even-size groups.
While the tie effect could have been perceived as univocally linked to
the frame of bimodal dynamics, the extension to three-party competition
was shown to preserve the feature with the appearance of another type of
tie linked to the possible absence of majority in even-size groups with equal
votes for each party. Such a robustness of the dictatorship effects was al-
ready discussed in those earlier works on bottom-up hierarchical voting but
only schematically at specific cases [1, 2, 35]. The tie resolution is no longer
grounded on the necessity to have at least fifty percent plus one vote to
win an election. It is a result of local alliances among the various parties in
competition.
It took fourteen years before I completed a systematic investigation with
Gelke and Peliti [36] and only recently additional results were obtained on
lobbying effect [4]. In parallel several works have extended my earlier inves-
tigation of three-opinion dynamics. One study choses to select the opinion
at a tie either randomly or picking it up from the nearest group [37]. Others
works consider the voter model [38, 39]. The competition between persua-
siveness and inflexibility was also analyzed [40]. The problem of emergence
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of extremism has been also addressed by introducing a middle discrete option
in the so called CODA model [41].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets back the
problem as investigated in 1990. Going through the bottom-up voting the
procedure to predict the outcome of an election is reviewed. Some new in-
sight is provided for the pair case which has not bee treated in the earlier
papers [1, 2, 35]. The emblematic case of groups of size 4 is described at
some length. The recipe for building up the perfect democratic dictatorship
is outlined in SubSection 2.2. The shift from from 2 to 3 parties is studied
in Section 3 where the first SubSection is devoted to the systematic deter-
mination of the bottom-up voting flow given all possible sets of local and
global alliances among the three competing parties. The two dimensional
landscape is found to include nine fixed points whose stability is studied.
Section 4 illustrates a few meaningful cases of tricky dynamics produced by
different sets of local alliances among the 3 parties. The case of a small
party facing two opposite big ones is analyzed in details exhibiting subtle
and counter-intuitive outcomes. The opposite case of a big party just below
fifty percent facing two small ones both around twenty-five percent is also
investigated. Last but not least, the voting flows for a set of four different
bottom supports are exhibited each with eight different sets of alliances in a
series of Figures. Some concluding remarks end the paper.
2 Setting back the problem as in 1990: dicta-
torship effect of two-party democratic com-
petition
The problem of bottom-up democratic voting in hierarchical structures is
reviewed as studied in the earlier works of 1986 [1] and 1990 [2]. Some new
results are presented for the case of voting groups of size 2.
Two parties A and B are competing to run a bottom-up democratic hi-
erarchical structure. It may be a political group, a firm, a society or any
human organization. Each member of the corresponding frame supports a
specific party. At the moment of the vote for building up the hierarchy, the
overall respective proportions in favor of A and B are p0 and (1 − p0) with
the social entity concerned with the election.
The bottom level of the hierarchy is constituted from people who have
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been selected at random from the associated population. They are randomly
organized in small groups of size r. Then, in a second step, each one of
these r-sized groups elects a representative according to a local majority
rule. Following the local majority in favor of either A or B the associated
representative is a supporter of A or B.
For odd sized groups a local majority always exists for a two party com-
petition with every member holding a specific support. However for even-size
groups a tie may occur, resulting in a no majority situation. In these cases,
mechanisms of different kinds can be evoked to justify that an A supporter is
elected with a probability of k and a B supporter with a probability (1− k).
The value of k is a direct function of both the psycho-sociological nature and
the history of the population as well as the current voting procedures.
Those elected agents constitute the first hierarchical level of the hierarchy
denoted by level 1 with respect to the bottom level denoted 0. The local group
voting process used at the bottom level is then repeated again identically to
build a second level with now the voting groups formed by random selection of
the elected representatives. Those groups elect their respective representative
which in turn constitute the second level of the hierarchy.
The process is repeated n times using the same voting scheme to move
from a level l to the above level (l+1). Each time, starting from the elected
people at a given level, new groups are formed, which in turn elect new
representatives to build up a higher level. At the top level is the president.
However, since each one of these votes reduces the number of associated
representatives by a factor r from level l to level (l + 1), it is necessary
to have selected enough local bottom groups in order to ensure an n-level
hierarchy. Therefore rn local groups are required at the bottom level 0 to have
a succession of n levels. This yields respectively rn−1 elected representatives
at level 1, rn−2 elected representatives at level 2, rn−l elected representatives
at level l and rn−n = 1 elected representative at level n. Figure (1) shows a
bottom-up hierarchy with 3 levels and voting groups of size 4.
2.1 Predicting the election outcome
For group size r the probability pl+1 to have an A supporter elected at level
(l + 1) can be calculated explicitly from pl, the proportion of A supporter
representatives at level l. The voting function pl+1 = Pr(pl) is,
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President: Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
Bottom: Level 0
Figure 1: A bottom-up hierarchy with 3 levels and voting groups of size 4.
Pr(pl) =
r∑
m= r+1
2
(
r
m
)
pml (1− pl)r−m, (1)
for odd sizes r, and
Pr(pl) ≡
r∑
m= r
2
+1
(
r
m
)
pml (1− pl)r−m + k
(
r
r
2
)
p
r
2
l (1− pl)
r
2 , (2)
when r is even.
A broken democratic balance is monitored by k, in favor of A when k >
1
2
and B for k < 1
2
. The democratic balance is restored only at k = 1
2
.
Depending on the current values of p0, r and n, we have either 0 < pn <
1) yielding a probabilistic outcome or pn ≈ 0, 1 allowing a deterministic
result within some digit precision since bottom proportions are given by real
numbers. In the following probabilities are rounded to full percents with two
digits after the decimal points unless otherwise stated.
In real systems, voting groups can be of different sizes making necessary
to consider combination of those sizes pondered with their respective propor-
tions making the voting function more complicated to solve but preserving
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the main features of the associated voting dynamics. Solving Pr(pl) = pl the
two fixed points pB = 0 and pA = 1 are always found. They are invariant
with size change.
For r = 2 Eq. (2) writes,
p1 ≡ P2(p0) = p20 + 2kp0(1− p0) , (3)
making either pB = 0 or pA = 1 an attractor of the dynamics with the other
one being unstable. Indeed, when k > 1
2
, any p0 6= 0 would grow while
climbing up the hierarchy to eventually reach the value of 1 provided the
number of levels n is sufficiently large, as seen in Figure (2) for the cases
p0 = 0.001, 0.01, 0.10, 0.30 with k = 0.6.
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Figure 2: Any small proportion p0 grows while climbing up the hierarchy to
eventually reach 1 provided the number of levels n is sufficiently large. The
cases p0 = 0.001, 0.01, 0.10, 0.30 are shown with k = 0.6 for r = 2.
Even from a totally negligible p0 = 0.001 support at the bottom the A
party wins a good chance to get the presidency. For instance, 40 levels boost
p0 = 0.001 up to p40 = 0.64 while p0 = 0.01, 0.10, 0.30 yields respectively
p40 = 0.96, 1, 1. However, no real hierarchy will have forty levels, most having
much less, usually of the order 10. Yet , p0 = 0.10 and 0.30 yields p10 =
0.85, 0.97 respectively giving a significant chance to win the presidency. The
dynamics of pl+1 as a function of pl+1 is illustrated in Figure (3) for the case
k = 0.9 together with the evolution from p0 = 0.10 shown from right to left
for eight levels.
Such a radical effect in favor of the status quo of pair interactions has
been substantiated in some nice work by Krzysztof Kulakowski and Maria
Nawojczyk [28] on the votes of married couples in the United States.
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Figure 3: The variation of pl+1 as a function of pl+1 for r = 2 at k = 0.9.
The evolution from p0 = 0.10 is shown from roght to left. Eight levels are
required to reach 1.
Contrary to the very unbalanced precedent r = 2 case the next smallest
size of r = 3 ensures a democratically balance with
pl+1 ≡ P3(pl) = p3l + 3p2l (1− pl) . (4)
Besides pB = 0 and pA = 1 a third unstable fixed point pc,3 =
1
2
appears.
Now, repeating votes drive towards either full power at pA for p0 >
1
2
or total
disappearance at pB when p0 <
1
2
. The dynamics is democratic since the
bottom majority secures the top outcome.
For instance p0 = 0.45 yields the series p1 = 0.42, p2 = 0.39, p3 = 0.34,
p4 = 0.26, p5 = 0.17, p6 = 0.08 down to p7 = 0.02 before p8 = 0.00. A
strong minority of 45% is self-eliminated within 8 levels. Fewer levels give a
chance to the minority of running the organization. The situation is perfectly
symmetrical with respect to A and B. Both share the same threshold to full
power.
The bottom-up voting structure simultaneously allocates local power to
the minority party and ensures the organization presidency to the major-
ity opinion given enough numbers of levels. It costs very little in terms of
manpower since only a small part of the associated population is needed to
implement and activate the hierarchy. Above dynamics is invariant for an
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increase in the size r as long as odd values are used. Only the number of
levels decreases and the number of people increases.
At r = 4, the next up size, three fixed points are obtained as before
with still pB = 0 and pA = 1 but the unstable fixed point pc,r is no longer
at 1
2
turning the dynamics non democratic. The associated threshold value
becomes asymmetric for rulers and non rulers. For r = 4 the probability to
have a representative A elected given by Eq. (2) is,
pl+1 ≡ P4(pl) = p4l + 4p3l (1− pl) + 6kp2l (1− pl)2 , (5)
where the last term embodies the bias in favor of A. For the extreme case
k = 0 the tipping point for A is thus,
pc,4 =
1 +
√
13
6
≈ 0.77 , (6)
which is drastically shifted from 1
2
. Simultaneously, the B threshold to stick to
power is down to ≈ 23%. Eq. (6) is independent of n and determines the flux
of the probabilities going up the hierarchy for A with p0 > pc,4 → pl+1 > pl
against p0 < pc,4 → pl+1 < pl. Simultaneously the tipping point for B to
increase or decrease its representation is (1 − pc,4). The number of levels
fixes the final probability for the presidency. When it is sufficiently large the
probability becomes either one or zero.
To stick to power, provided there exists sufficient levels, the B needs only
to get over 23% of the bottom support while to take over power, the A needs
to boost their support at above 77%. The bottom-up voting is no longer
democratic.
In addition the number of levels to democratic self-elimination is even
smaller than in the democratic r = 3 case. For r = 4 and k = 0, the above
r = 3 series changes to p0 = 0.45, p1 = 0.24, p2 = 0.05 and p3 = 0.00.
Instead of 8 levels, 3 are enough to make the A disappear from the elected
representatives. Even p0 = 0.70 yields p1 = 0.66, p2 = 0.57, p3 = 0.42,
p4 = 0.20, p5 = 0.03, and p6 = 0.00 making a support of 70% self-eliminated
democratically after six bottom-up levels.
An a priori reasonable bias in favor of the ruling party with k = 1 mo-
tivated by the statement “to make a change you need a majority”, turns a
majority rule democratic voting into a totalitarian outcome.
Increasing the size of even groups weakens the breaking of the democratic
symmetry between the two parties as expected since increasing the size makes
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the chance of getting a tie less probable. From pc,4 =
1+
√
13
6
for size 4 we
have pc,r =
1
2
for r → ∞. Larger voting group sizes also reduce the number
of levels necessary to get to the stable fixed points, which in turn guarantee
a deterministic result.
Figure (4) shows the results of repeating voting for p0 = 0.65 using voting
groups of respective sizes of r = 3, 4, 5, 6. The bottom-up voting outcomes
are shown as a function of the hierarchical level.
2 4 6 8 10 Level l
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pl
r=5
r=6
r=3
r=4
Figure 4: Climbing up the hierarchy p0 = 0.65 as a function of the hierar-
chical level for voting group sizes of r = 3, 4, 5, 6. The cases r = 3 and r = 5
leads to A ruling from the fifth level for r = 3 and the fourth level for r = 5.
The cases r = 4 and r = 6 leads to B ruling although the A party has a
stronger majority at the bottom. However, the B party rules with certainty
from the fifth level using r = 4 and only from the ninth one for r = 6.
2.2 Building the perfect democratic dictatorship
Above results show that to start beyond the threshold guarantees an increas-
ing weight in terms of the elected representatives. However to be certain to
win at the presidency level, the minimum number of levels required is a func-
tion the bottom support p0. Accordingly, to calculate the critical number of
levels which ensures running the organization, provided that p0 > pc,r, is ob-
tained by expanding the voting function pl = Pr(pl−1) around the unstable
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fixed point pc,r with,
pl ≈ pc,r + (pl−1 − pc,r)λr , (7)
where λr ≡ dPr(pn)dpn |pc,r and Pr(pc,r) = pc,r. Rewriting Eq. (7) as
pl − pc,r ≈ (pl−1 − pc,r)λr , (8)
and iterating from level l down to level 0 we get,
pl − pc,r ≈ (p0 − pc,r)λlr , (9)
which yields,
pl ≈ pc,r + (p0 − pc,r)λlr , (10)
which in turn leads to,
l ≈ 1
lnλr
ln
(
pl − pc,r
p0 − pc,r
)
. (11)
Writing ∆top ≡ ptop − pc,r and ∆bot ≡ p0 − pc,r Eq. (11) becomes
nc,r ≈ 1
lnλr
ln
(
∆top
∆bot
)
, (12)
where nc,r is the critical number of levels requires to reach the value ptop at
the top of the hierarchy starting from p0 at the bottom. Similarly ∆top and
∆bot measure the distance to the tipping point from respectively the top and
the bottom of the hierarchy.
Eq. (12) yields two different critical numbers of levels n+c,r (p0 > pc,r,
∆top = 1 − pc,r) and n−c,r (∆top = −pc,r for p0 < pc,r) for the respective
certainty to win and loose the presidency for A. The variation of nc,r as a
function of p0 for group sizes r = 4, 10, 30 is exhibited in Figure (5).
Although above expansions are expected to be valid only for p0 in the
vicinity of pc,r they are found to be rather good estimates over the whole of
the range of values from 0 to 1. This is not the case for Eq. (10).
Rewriting Eq. (10) to extract the value of p0 we have,
p0 = pc,r + (pl − pc,r)λ−lr . (13)
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Figure 5: The variation of the critical number of levels nc,r as a function of
p0 for three group sizes r = 4, 10, 30.
Therefore, given an n-level hierarchy using voting groups of size r the crit-
ical value of bottom support pr,n0,B at and below which the B party wins the
presidency is given by
pr,n0,B = pc,r(1− λ−nr ) , (14)
having plugged pl = 0, which means that at level l the A party is certain to
get zero elected representative.
At the other extreme pn = 1 gives the bottom threshold p
r,n
0,A from which
the challenging A party wins the presidency. We thus get
pr,n0,A = p
r,n
0,B + λ
−n
r , (15)
where pr,n0,B is given by Eq. (14).
Three regimes are obtained, of which two are deterministic and one is
probabilistic. For p0 < p
r,n
0,B, pm = 0, ∀m ≥ n while pm = 1, ∀m ≥ n when
p0 > p
r,n
0,a. In between with p
r,n
0,B < p0 < p
r,n
0,A we have 0 < pn < 1, i.e., the
vote outcome for presidency is probabilistic. This intermediate probabilistic
regime determines a coexistence window where some democracy is prevailing
since no party is sure of winning, which makes the shift of leadership a reality.
However Eq. (15) shows that this democratic window shrinks as a power law
λ−nr of the number n of hierarchical levels. We have p
r,n
0,A ⇒ pr,n0,B where
n >> 1.
12
3 From two up to three competing parties
Above study of two competing parties relies on the broken tie hypothesis,
which indeed required the existence of even-size voting groups. However, tie
breaking may also occur for odd sizes when three parties A, B, and C are
competing with A B C configurations. There, the tie cannot be resolved by
giving an advantage to the ruling party. While for two parties it makes sense
that the challenging party must have at least half plus one votes to win the
election, for three parties at a tie each party has one third of the votes, which
is less than fifty of the votes, so none is legitimated to have an advantage.
Therefore, an agreement among two parties at the expense of the third one
is necessary to win the election.
Before starting one can be tempted to ask why not to solve an apparently
simpler case considering groups of size 2? First reason is because size 2
exhibits a tie already with two opinions belonging to the even size family. The
second cause is the fact that 3 opinions produce 3 tie configurations A B, A C
and C D requesting three independent parameters to define what happens for
each case. Therefore, the problem takes place in a three dimensional space.
At the contrary, for size 3, while no tie exists for two opinions, for three
opinions there exists only one tie configuration A B C with two independent
parameters to define what happens as it is shown below. Therefore size 3 is
left for future work.
Voting rules are shown in Figure (6). Local majority wins making 2 A, 2
B, 2 C to elect respectively an A, B, or C, whatever the third agent. All six
configurations with 1 A, 1 B, 1 C require a voting agreement between two
parties to elect a representative. Party alliances can be global or local. In
this case, to account for all possibilities we introduce a probability α to have
an A elected, a probability β to have a B elected and a probability γ to have a
C elected under the constraint α+β+γ = 1. For the sake of the presentation
we select α and β as the independent parameters with γ = 1− α− β.
Denoting pa,l, pb,l, pc,l of A, B and C representatives the respective pro-
portions of elected representatives of party A, B and C at level l, we have
pa,l+1, pb,l+1, pc,l+1 at level (l + 1). These proportions obey the constraint
pa,l+pb,l+pc,l = 1 since we assume that every agent supports one party. The
associated voting functions for respectively A, B and C are,
pa,l+1 ≡ Pa,3(pa,l, pb,l) = p3a,l+3p2a,l(1− pa,l) + 6αpa,lpb,l(1− pa,l− pb,l) , (16)
pb,l+1 ≡ Pb,3(pa,l, pb,l) = p3b,l + 3p2b,l(1− pb,l) + 6βpa,lpb,l(1− pa,l − pb,l) , (17)
13
Figure 6: The voting rules for groups of size 3.
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pc,l+1 = (1− pa,l+1 − pb,l+1) , (18)
where Eq. (18) reduces the problem to two dimensions with (pa,l, pb,l, pc,l)
confined onto the triangle shown in Figure (7). A point Pl associated to
pa,l, pb,l, pc,l is represented simultaneously in both coordinate systems as
~OPl ≡ pa,l~i+ pb,l~j + pc,l~k = ~OC + qa,l~u+ qb,l~v + qc,l ~w, (19)
with (pa,l, pb,l, pc,l) for (O,~i,~j,~k) and (qa,l, qb,l, qc,l) for (C, ~u,~v, ~w).
Having (see Figure (7))


~u =
√
6
6
(~i+~j)−
√
2√
3
~k,
~v =
√
2
2
(−~i+~j),
~w =
√
3
3
(~i+~j + ~k),
(20)
we get, 

qa,l =
√
6
2
(pa,l + pb,l),
qb,l =
1√
2
(−pa,l + pb,l),
qc,l = −1 + pa,l + pb,l + pc,l = 0.
(21)
Eqs. (21) demonstrates the reduction of the three dimensional space onto
the two-dimensional triangle ABC of Figure (7) spanned by (C, ~u,~v). The
coordinates (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1) of A,B,C become (
√
3/
√
2,−√2/2),
(
√
3/
√
2,
√
2/2) and (0, 0). We thus have −√2/2 ≤ qa,l ≤
√
2/2 and 0 ≤
qb,l ≤
√
3/
√
2 with the constraint 0 ≤ qa,l + qb,l ≤ 1.
3.1 Determining the bottom-up voting flow
Solving the set of fixed point Equations


pa,l+1 = pa,l ,
pb,l+1 = pb,l ,
pc,l+1 = pc,l.
(22)
15
Figure 7: The three party problem reduces to a two-dimensional problem.
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allows to build the bottom-up voting phase diagram. Putting one proportion
equal to zero makes the two other fixed point equations identical to the
two party case. For instance p∗c = 0 satisfies pc,l+1 = pc,l, which in turn
reduces pa,l+1 = pa,l and pb,l+1 = pb,l to the form of Eq. (4) with pl+1 ==
p3l + 3p
2
l (1− pl).
We thus have p∗c = 0 with p
∗
a = 0, 1/2, 1 and p
∗
b = 0, 1/2, 1. All associated
combinations (p∗a, p
∗
b , p
∗
c) are valid solutions of Eq. (22) provided their sum
is equal to one with then only the two solutions (0, 1, 0) and (1/2, 1/2, 0).
Permutations on a, b, c, yields (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (1/2, 0, 1/2), (0, 1/2, 1/2)
amounting to a total of six fixed points,
• A for (1, 0, 0),
• B for (0, 1, 0),
• C for (0, 0, 1),
• O’ for (1/2, 1/2, 0),
• E for (1/2, 0, 1/2),
• F for (0, 1/2, 1/2).
in (O,~i,~j,~k) and,
• A with (1, 0, 0),
• B with (0, 1, 0),
• O with (0, 0, 0),
• O’ with (1/2, 1/2, 0),
• A’ with (1/2, 0, 0),
• B’ with (0, 1/2, 0),
in (O,~i,~j) as shown in Figure (8) where the associated flows to each one of
the two party combinations along the three one dimensional lines A-O’-B,
A-E-C, B, F, C together with the projections onto the (O,~i,~j) are included.
The six fixed points A, B, C, O’, E, F as well as their projection in the
(O,~i,~j) plane are independent of the value of α and β since indeed they
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Figure 8: The six fixed points A, B, C, E, F, O’ are shown together with
their projections A, B, O, A’, B’, O’ onto the plane (O,~i,~j). The respective
stability of each point is indicated by arrows.
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correspond to the limit cases where one proportion is zero with A, E, C
corresponding to pb = 0; B, F, C to pa = 0; and A, O’, B to pc = 0. In such
a case no tie occurs since the problem is reduced to 2 parties. The respective
flows along each line AC, CB, BA, are also independent of α and β for the
same reason.
However, before searching for eventual additional fixed points, Eq. (22)
has in principle nine solutions, it is worth first investigating the stability of
all six fixed points A, B, C, O’, E, F shown in Figure (8). This will allow us
to reduce the search for numerical solutions by determining the (α, β) range
where extra fixed points are expected inside the triangle ABC.
Performing a Taylor expansion of Eqs. (16, 17) around a fixed point
(p∗a, p
∗
b) with respect to pa,l and pb,l we get


da,a ≡ ∂Pa,3(pa,l,pb,l)∂pa,l = −6p2a,l + 6pa,l + 6αpb,l(1− 2pa,l − pb,l) ,
da,b ≡ ∂Pa,3(pa,l,pb,l)∂pb,l = 6αpa,l(1− pa,l − 2pb,l) ,
(23)
and 

db,a ≡ ∂Pb,3(pa,l,pb,l)∂pa,l = 6βpb,l(1− 2pa,l − pb,l) ,
db,b ≡ ∂Pb,3(pa,l,pb,l)∂pb,l = −6p2b,l + 6pb,l + 6βpa,l(1− pa,l − 2pb,l) .
(24)
Plugging the coordinates (p∗a, p
∗
b) in Eqs. (23, 24) leads to,

pa,l+1 − p∗a
pb,l+1 − p∗b

 = M


pa,l − p∗a
pb,l − p∗b

 (25)
where
M =


d∗a,a d
∗
a,b
d∗b,a d
∗
b,b

 . (26)
We then diagonalize the matrix M to find out its associated eigenvalues
M∗ =


λ∗a 0
0 λ∗b

 . (27)
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and the associated two eigenvectors,
V ∗a =


V ∗a,a
V ∗a,b

 , V ∗b =


V ∗b,a
V ∗b,b

 . (28)
Plugging in Eq. (26) the A, B, C, O’, E, F six fixed point coordinates we get
respectively,
MA =MB =MC = MO =


0 0
0 0

 , (29)
MO′ =


3
2
(1− α) −3
2
α
−3
2
β 3
2
(1− β)

 , (30)
ME =MA′ =


3
2
3
2
α
0 3
2
β

 , (31)
MF =MB′ =


3
2
α 0
3
2
β 3
2

 . (32)
which in turn yield the respective eigenvalues


λAa = λ
B
a = λ
C
a = λ
O
a = 0
λAb = λ
B
b = λ
C
b = λ
O
b = 0
, (33)


λO
′
a =
3
2
λO
′
b =
3
2
(1− α− β)
, (34)


λEa = λ
A′
a =
3
2
λEb = λ
A′
b =
3
2
β
, (35)


λFa = λ
B′
a =
3
2
λFb = λ
B′
b =
3
2
α
. (36)
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For the first series of the zero matrix Eq. (29) any vector is an eigenvector
and in particular along ~i and ~j, which gives,
Va,A = Va,B = Va,C = Va,O =


1
0

 , (37)
Vb,A = Vb,B = Vb,C = Vb,O =


0
1

 . (38)
For the other series, the associated eigenvectors are,
Va,O′ =


−1
1

 , Vb,O′ =


α
β
1

 , (39)
Va,E = Va,A′ =


1
0

 , Vb,E = Vb,A′ =


−α
1−β
1

 , (40)
Va,F = Va,B′ =

 0
1

 , Vb,F = Vb,B′ =


−1−α
β
1

 . (41)
Having λAa = λ
B
a = λ
C
a = λ
O
a = λ
A
b = λ
B
b = λ
C
b = λ
O
b = 0 indicates that
the fixed points A, B, C are stable in all directions as well as O within the
projection onto the (O,~i,~j) plane. On the contrary, the result λO
′
a = λ
E
a =
λA
′
a = λ
F
a = λ
B′
a =
3
2
makes the O’, A’, B’ fixed points unstable along the ~i
direction and O’ E, F unstable along the transformed direction in the ABC
plane obtained using the transformation Eq. (21). Indeed the corresponding
eigenvectors in the plane (C, ~u,~v) are,
Wa,A =Wa,B =Wa,C = Wa,O =


√
3
2
1√
2

 , (42)
Wb,A = Vb,B = Wb,C = Wb,O =


√
3
2
− 1√
2

 . (43)
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For the other series the associated eigenvectors are less “sexy” in their ex-
pression with
Wa,O′ =


0
√
2

 ,Wb,O′ =


√
3
2
(α+β
β
)
(−α+β√
2β
)

 , (44)
Wa,E = V1,A′ =


√
3
2
− 1√
2

 ,Wb,E = V2,A′ =


√
3
2
−1+α+β
−1+β
−1−α+β√
2(−1+β)

 , (45)
Wa,F = W1,B′ =


√
3
2
1√
2

 ,Wb,F =W2,B′ =


1
β
√
3
2
(−1 + α + β)
1−α+β√
2β

 . (46)
All the first eigenvectors, which correspond to the 3/2 eigenvalue, are
along the sides of the triangle ABC or its projection OAB as seen in Fig-
ure (8). In addition, for each one of them, the stability along the other
eigevector direction, i.e., the direction towards the interior of the triangle
ABC, depends on α and β as seen from their respective second eigenvalue
λO
′
b , λ
E
b = λ
A′
b , λ
F
b = λ
B′
b (Eqs. (34, 35, 36)). We thus have:
• Stability for O’, i.e., the flow goes towards the side of the triangle, when
γ = (1− α− β) < 2
3
. The direction is unstable otherwise and the flow
goes towards the interior of the triangle when (α+ β) > 1
3
.
• Stability for (E, A’), i.e., the flow goes towards the side of the triangle,
when β < 2
3
. The direction is unstable otherwise and the flow goes
towards the interior of the triangle when β > 2
3
.
• Stability for (F, B’), i.e., the flow goes towards the side of the triangle,
when α < 2
3
. The direction is unstable otherwise and the flow goes
towards the interior of the triangle when α > 2
3
.
As can be seen from Figure (8), the basin of attraction of each stable fixed
points C, A, B and O, A, B include respectively the triangle CEF, AEO’,
BFO’ and OA’B’, AA’O’, BB’O’. Depending on the value of the biases α
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and β the strategic question is to determine which party benefits from the
inside triangles A’B’O’ and EFO’. In other words, which part of that triangle
coalesces with the three incompressible basins of attraction?
From the above findings it is seen that if one of the flows, which goes
towards the interior of the triangle, i.e., either α, β or γ is larger than two
thirds, then the two other values must be simultaneously lower than two
thirds since α + β + γ = 1. This means that if one direction towards the
inside of the triangle is unstable, both others are necessarily stable. However,
while only one direction can be unstable at a time, the three directions can
be simultaneously stable, i.e., α < 2/3, β < 2/3 and γ < 2/3.
One straightforward way to resolve the question directly is to extract all
possible nine solutions from Eq. (22). However the difficulty is that it is not
possible to find all the solutions analytically. To be more precise, I was not
able to do it, at least with compact and tractable expressions. Some intuitive
and hand waving arguments are thus welcome to simplify the search for the
eventual relevant solutions.
4 Illustrating the tricky dynamics
4.1 A small party versus two large competing ones
Many situations are characterized by the competition between two big parties
A and B, of which none has the absolute majority. While they usually defend
very different policies on key issues, there often exists a third party C, small
in terms of support, whose emphasis is to ensure some specific interest of a
given minority. In that conjecture one of the two large parties must get the
support of C to ensure the hierarchy presidency.
We consider first the case of a voting group size of 3 making the assump-
tion that at any local tie, i.e., at a (A B C) configuration, it is a C agent who
is elected whether a coalition is set up with A or B. The voting Equations
are written as,
pa,l+1 ≡ Pa,3(pa,l) = p3a,l + 3p2a,l(1− pa,l) , (47)
pb,l+1 ≡ Pb,3(pb,l) = p3b,l + 3p2b,l(1− pb,l) , (48)
pc,l+1 ≡ Pc,3(pc,l) = p3c,l + 3p2c,l(1− pc,l) + 6pa,lpb,lpc,l , (49)
23
where Eqs. (16) and (17) are identical to the voting function for two compet-
ing parties. Therefore for A and B the critical threshold to win the hierarchy
presidency requires a bottom support of above 50%. The corresponding
number of levels to reach the presidency with certainty is also unchanged.
Accordingly, when neither A nor B has more than fifty percent of support,
the bottom-up voting increases the proportion of C representatives while de-
creasing those of A and B as seen from the flow diagram Figure (9). The
domain of attraction for the bottom small party C is twice as large as those
of A and B.
Four different bottom supports for A and B are shown in Figure (9) with
respectively pa,0 = 0.41, pb,0 = 0.52, pc,0 = 0.17 (noted with “1”); pa,0 =
0.55, pb,0 = 0.39, pc,0 = 0.06 (noted with “2”); pa,0 = 0.48, pb,0 = 0.49, pc,0 =
0.03 (noted with “3”); pa,0 = 0.45, pb,0 = 0.38, pc,0 = 0.17 (noted with “4”).
The black squares are the various fixed points. The triangle vertices are the
three attractors. Only pa,0 = 0.55 > 1/2 drives the A party towards the
presidency as pb,0 = 0.52 > 1/2 does for B. Any bottom support within the
rectangle leads towards increasing C power.
Another illustration showing the evolution from pa,0 = 0.48, pb,0 = 0.46
and pc,0 = 0.06 up to pa,12, pb,12, pc,12 is exhibited in Figure (10). Although
the minority party C has only six percent of support at the bottom, its
representative power will grow dramatically while climbing democratically
the hierarchy levels taking advantage of the alliance set (α = 0, β = 0, γ = 1).
At the seventh level it reaches the majority and then keeps growing to reach
the presidency with certainty already at level 1 with pa,10 = 1. This feature
illustrates perfectly an agreement which indeed is what French call “Un jeu
de dupes”, or in English, ”pulling the wool over your eyes”. Such a situation
implies a non uniform set of alliances as illustrated in the next Subsection.
4.2 More on small party versus two large competing
ones
Therefore, it is not efficient for either one of the large parties to make a
systematic alliance with the minority party C since it is equivalent to putting
it in power after climbing up a sufficient number of levels. The aim of the
agreement was to allow the corresponding large party to get the presidency.
We thus need to revisit the alliance scheme. Consider now that parties A
and C are still making an alliance, but in two steps. From the bottom and
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Figure 9: The alliance set follows (α = 0, β = 0, γ = 1). As soon as pa,0 < 1/2
and pb,0 < 1/2, C will grow in power holding by climbing up the hierarchy.
Four bottom supports are considered pa,0 = 0.41, pb,0 = 0.52, pc,0 = 0.17
(noted with “1”); pa,0 = 0.55, pb,0 = 0.39, pc,0 = 0.06 (noted with “2”);
pa,0 = 0.48, pb,0 = 0.49, pc,0 = 0.03 (noted with “3”); pa,0 = 0.45, pb,0 =
0.38, pc,0 = 0.17 (noted with “4”). The C domain for power increase (a
square) is double that for A and B (isosceles triangle). The black squares are
the various fixed points with the triangle vertices being the three attractors.
up a few levels, A votes for C in case of a (A B C) tie, thus boosting the C
representation. But then, after for instance reaching the fifth level, starting
from there, C have to vote for A in case of a tie. The precedent “Un jeu de
dupes” is now a balanced win-win agreement as seen using the same bottom
supports pa,0 = 0.48, pb,0 = 0.46, pc,0 = 0.06.
For the first five levels the new alliance scheme yields the same series as
before with pa,1 = 0.47, pb,1 = 0.44, pc,1 = 0.09, pa,2 = 0.45, pb,2 = 0.41, pc,2 =
0.14, pa,3 = 0.43, pb,3 = 0.37, pc,3 = 0.20, pa,4 = 0.40, pb,4 = 0.31, pc,4 = 0.29,
and pa,5 = 0.35, pb,5 = 0.22, pc,5 = 0.43. This means an increase of 37% for C
and a 13% decrease for A from the hierarchy bottom up to level 5.
However, from level five and up while voting for the level above, in case of
a (A B C) tie C votes for A. Now, after the first range of levels where A has
lost support, the dynamics is reverse with A starting to grow steadily towards
the presidency as shown in the left side of Figure (11) with pa,6 = 0.48, pb, =
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Figure 10: The respective variation of power sharing for A, B, C from a
bottom support pa,0 = 0.48 (solid line), pb,0 = 0.46 (dotted line), pc,0 = 0.06
(dashed line) as a function of the hierarchy level up to level 12. The tiny
minority party C starts from six percent of support at the bottom and yet
gets more and more power while climbing democratically the hierarchy levels.
At level six it eventually reaches the majority to reach the presidency with
certainty already at level ten. This is what is known in French as “Un jeu
de dupes”.
0.13, pc,6 = 0.39, pa,7 = 0.62, pb,7 = 0.04, pc,7 = 0.34, pa,8 = 0.73, pb,8 =
0.01, pc,8 = 0.26, pa,9 = 0.83, pb,9 = 0.00, pc,9 = 0.13, pa,10 = 0.92, pb,10 =
0.00, pc,10 = 0.08, pa,11 = 0.98, pb,11 = 0.00, pc,11 = 0.02, pa,12 = 1, pb,12 =
0.00, pc,12 = 0.00.
The strategy reveals itself to be rather efficient for both A and C. It is
worth stressing the fact that pa,6 = 0.48 = pa,0 is a pure coincidence resulting
from the rounding up. Indeed pa,6 = 0.484 and could be quite different from
pa,0 depending on both the pa,0 values.
The above two schemes of alliances demonstrates that the alliance must
be dealt with great care. The right side of Figure (11) shows the case of an
error from A with a reverse in the vote alliance with C only from level six
and up. It will be too late for A and C will eventually reach the presidency.
A mistake at the level at which the alliance direction has to be switched is
crucial. To avoid confusion, it is worth to stress that a voting agreement at
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Figure 11: The same as in Figure (10) but here the set of alliance between A
and C is different. Left: from the bottom up to level 5 not included, A votes
for C in the case of a tie, but from level 5 and up party C votes for A in
case of a tie. Now A eventually reaches the presidency although C gained a
substantial increase in power. Right: same as left with a “slight” difference.
Here C votes for A at a tie only from level 6 up. The result is disastrous for
A and great for C since at level 6 C has already gained the majority.
a level l yields an effect at level (l + 1).
For instance, within the above figures, selecting level six instead of five
turns out to be a disaster for A as seen from the series with pa,6 = 0.28, pb,6 =
0.13, pc,6 = 0.59; pa,7 = 0.32, pb,7 = 0.04, pc,7 = 0.64; pa,8 = 0.30, pb,8 =
0.01, pc,8 = 0.69; pa,9 = 0.22, pb,9 = 0.00, pc,9 = 0.78; pa,10 = 0.13, pb,10 =
0.00, pc,10 = 0.87; pa,11 = 0.05, pb,11 = 0.00, pc,11 = 0.95; pa,12 = 0.00, pb,12 =
0.00, pc,12 = 1; which are plotted in Figure (11).
The reversing voting bias came in too late to make A win since at level
6 C has already gained the majority making the dynamics leading towards
the C attractor independently of the alliance set. The result at level 7 with
pa,7 = 0.32 > pa,6 = 0.28 can be misleading since afterwards we have pa,8 <
pa,6 and so forth towards zero. As soon as a party gets the majority it is
certain to win the presidency provided there exists a sufficient number of
levels. Accordingly any agreement from one of the big party should prevent
totally the small party from reaching ever the majority at any level.
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4.3 A large party just below 50% versus two equal
medium size ones
After investigating the case of two big parties versus a small one it is worth
to look briefly at the case of one big party just below the winning level of
50% competing with two opposite medium size parties. Precisely, Figure (12)
shows the case pa,0 = 0.498, pb,0 = pc,0 = 0.251 with an agreement between
the big party A and party C in favor of C up to the first 4 levels and in favor
of A for the next 8 levels of a 12 level hierarchy (left part of the Figure).
While B disappears totally from level 4 and up, party A loses the lead
at the benefit of party C, which turns to majority from level 4 and up.
At the top hierarchy the probability for C to get the presidency is 0.73
while it is only 0.34 for A although it has almost fifty at the bottom with
pa,12 = 0.27, pb,12 = 0, pc,12 = 0.73.
A slightly different agreement placing the shift in favor of A from level
3 instead of 4 (right part of the Figure) modifies substantially the outcome.
While C is still getting more representatives even getting ahead of A at level
3 with pa,3 = 0.493, pb,3 = 0.013, pc,3 = 0.494, the dynamics is reversed at the
higher levels with at the top level pa,12 = 0.72, pb,12 = 0, pc,12 = 0.28.
The case illustrates once more the very subtle sensibility to where to place
the shit to favor one party against the other one within a coalition agreement.
4.4 Illustration for different sets of (α, β, γ)
To enhance the associated various voting dynamics we show two Figures (13,
14) with a series of snapshots combining four initial (bottom) probability
sets Bi for (pa,0, pb,0, pc,0) with i = 1, 2, 3, 4 with eight alliance probabilities
Aj for (α, β, γ) where j = 1, 2, ..., 8. These four bottom cases are:
B1 : (0.41, 0.52, 0.07) (noted with “1”);
B2 : (0.39, 0.39, 0.22) (noted with “2”);
B3 : (0.26, 0.33, 0.41) (noted with “3”);
B4 : (0.16, 0.33, 0.51) (noted with “4”);
with the eight alliance probabilities
A1 : (0.12, 0.70, 0.18);
A2 : (0.22, 0.22, 0.56);
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Figure 12: The respective variation of power sharing for A, B, C from a
bottom support pa,0 = 0.498 (solid line), pb,0 = 0.251 (dotted line), pc,0 =
0.251 (dashed line) as a function of the hierarchy level up to level 12. Left:
from the bottom up to level 4 included, A votes for C in the case of a tie,
but from level 5 and up party C votes for A in case of a tie. Right: same as
left with a “slight” difference. Here C votes for A at a tie already from level
4 up.
A3 : (0.22, 0.62, 0.16);
A4 : (0.42, 0.56, 0.02);
A5 : (0.47, 0.17, 0.36);
A6 : (0.59, 0.37, 0.04);
A7 : (0.75, 0.23, 0.02);
A8 : (1, 0, 0).
The associated 32 combinations are shown in Figs. (13) and (14) with
four cases in each of the four figure parts, all for eight hierarchical levels.
After eight levels when an attractor is not reached the presidency winner
is probabilistic. In those cases more levels would be necessary to make the
presidency outcome deterministic. Non integer values for (α, β, γ) represent
averages over different voting groups at all levels. In particular it makes it
possible to take into account local defections with respect to global party
agreements.
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In Figure (13) we have A1 in upper left; A2 in upper right; A3 in lower
left; A1 in lower right; and In Figure (14) we have A5 in upper left; A6 in
upper right; A7 in lower left; A8 in lower right. The series of Figures (13, 14)
represent the two dimensional projection OAB of the plane ABC as shown
in Figure (8). The two frontiers which determine the respective basins of
attraction of each pure attractor are calculated numerically and drawn on
the Figures. The origin O is the projection of the C attractor. All fixed
points are also included.
5 Conclusion
Above illustrations demonstrate the drastic effect of slight differences in local
alliances to control democratically a bottom-up hierarchy. To design a win-
ning strategy requires to have access to the frontiers of the dynamics flow,
which are determined the faith of the elections. Their respective location
depends on the effective average value of (α, β, γ). What matters is the po-
sitioning within the “golden triangle” determined by the simultaneous tree
constraints pa,0 <
1
2
and pb,0 <
1
2
, and pc,0 <
1
2
, to win the presidency. On
this basis it is worth stressing that the distribution of the area of this golden
triangle in favor of each one of the party depends solely on (α, β, γ) inde-
pendently of the values of pa,0, pb,0, pc,0. Those average values are a function
of the alliances set up by the parties as well as the discipline to apply these
party agreements by local representatives. Once the frontiers are set, the
initial values determines the flow direction.
The voting flows shown in Figures (13, 14) are self explicative and do
not require additional comments. It puts a new quantitative light on the
dramatic effects of setting up alliances together with their local reliability
that needs to be implemented.
Three-party competition exhibits a rather rich and subtle dynamics driven
by the overall averages of local and global alliances the various parties can
build. Slight, a priori insignificant differences may induce drastic and counter
intuitive changes.
To conclude a word of caution is in order. The use of above results
for applications in real hierarchical organizations can turn anti-democratic.
However at the same time, the knowledge of those results can help improving
the democratic functioning of non democratic structures. It is fortunate that
Machiavel was missing the knowledge of renormalization group.
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Figure 13: Voting flow for eight hierarchical levels from the four bottom
values B1 : (0.41, 0.52, 0.07) (noted with “1”); B2 : (0.39, 0.39, 0.22) (noted
with “2”); B3 : (0.26, 0.33, 0.41) (noted with “3”); B4 : (0.16, 0.33, 0.51)
(noted with “4”); with the four set of alliances A1 : (0.12, 0.70, 0.18);
A2 : (0.22, 0.22, 0.56); A3 : (0.22, 0.62, 0.16); A4 : (0.42, 0.56, 0.02). The
black squares are the various fixed points with the triangle vertices being the
three attractors. When an attractor is not reached the presidency winner is
probabilistic.
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Figure 14: Voting flow for eight hierarchical levels from the four bottom
values B1 : (0.41, 0.52, 0.07) (noted with “1”); B2 : (0.39, 0.39, 0.22) (noted
with “2”); B3 : (0.26, 0.33, 0.41) (noted with “3”); B4 : (0.16, 0.33, 0.51)
(noted with “4”); with the four set of alliances A5 : (0.47, 0.17, 0.36); A6 :
(0.59, 0.37, 0.04); A7 : (0.75, 0.23, 0.02); A8 : (1, 0, 0). The black squares are
the various fixed points with the triangle vertices being the three attractors.
When an attractor is not reached the presidency winner is probabilistic.
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